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Introduction
The northern highlands are home to most
of Thailand’s 800,000 ethnic minority hill
peoples (chao khao in Thai, generally ren-
dered as “hill tribes” in English). Policies
towards highland minorities have been
shaped by territorial and security con-
cerns, the eradication of opium cultiva-
tion, and the control of shifting cultiva-
tion. A policy of integration towards the
hill peoples was adopted beginning in
1976. During the 1980s and 1990s, 5 inte-
grated rural development projects were
implemented, coordinated by the Office
of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB),
and supported by the United Nations
Drug Control Programme (UNDCP).
Their objectives were to replace opium
cultivation with alternative sources of
income and improve social services. This
paper examines 2 of these projects.
The two projects
Pae Por is a dissected mountain range near
the border with Myanmar in Chiang Mai
and Tak provinces, inhabited by Karen of
the Scaw sub-group (Figure 1). Wieng Pha
is situated on the border of Chiang Mai
and Chiang Rai provinces, and has an eth-
nically diverse population, including Lahu
(55%), Lisu (24%), Karen (13%), Akha
(5%), Meo (1%), local Thai (1%), and
Haw Chinese (1%). Features of the 2 proj-
ect areas are summarized in Table 1.
Rice was the main crop in both loca-
tions, cultivated on the uplands and as
irrigated paddy. Most households relied
on their own labor. Many households were
not self-sufficient in food, meeting the
shortfall through casual labor or sales of
forest products. Increasing population
pressure had resulted in declining fallow
periods and falling yields in both areas.
Physical infrastructure was poor, especially
in Pae Por, where only one village could
be reached by a paved road. Before the
project, health and education services
were very limited, especially in Pae Por,
where only 1% had any formal education.
Health indicators were very poor, especial-
ly for women. Substantial areas of opium
poppy were cultivated, and levels of addic-
tion were quite high in both project areas.
Complex and costly management
structures
Both projects aimed to raise the living
standards of hill tribe populations by
“improving socioeconomic position and
self-reliance and progressive integration
into the mainstream of Thai society,” as
they declared in their project documents.
Pae Por Highland Development Project
(HDP) was executed by the Department of
Local Administration (DOLA) and man-
aged by the 2 District Officers into whose
jurisdictions the project fell. At the field
level, implementation was centered on 15
“key villages,” each staffed with a 3-person
team consisting of a non-formal education
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This paper examines the impact of two mul-
tisectoral highland development projects on
ethnic minorities in northern Thailand. While
social sector interventions were relatively
successfully delivered and locally appreciat-
ed, strategies for agricultural development
failed to take account of local cultural and
production systems, and were fraught with a
range of design and implementation difficul-
ties. These uneven outcomes are traced to
the assumptions underlying project design,
contradictions in policy (especially relating
to land tenure), and the institutional cul-
tures of implementing agencies.
FIGURE 1  A traditional Karen house, Pae
Por Highland Development Project. (Photo
by author)
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teacher, a community health worker
(CHW), and an agricultural agent. Man-
agement of Wieng Pha, though formally
the responsibility of a multi-agency Project
Management Committee, in practice fell
to the Project Director in the Royal
Forestry Department (RFD), the execut-
ing agency. The heads of 4 RFD Water-
shed Development Units served as field
managers, each responsible for 2 to 4
project agroforestry extension officers.
The project designs were complex
(Wieng Pha had no less than 27 objectives
in 7 sectors) and both projects involved a
multiplicity of institutions, including
DOLA, RFD, the Ministries of Interior,
Public Health, Education, and the Depart-
ments of Public Welfare, Agricultural
Extension, Community Development, and
Technical and Economic Cooperation
(DTEC), some of which were involved at
national, provincial, and district levels. In
addition, 4 donor organizations supported
the projects: UNDCP, UNDP, UNICEF,
and UNFPA. This complexity led to intri-
cate management arrangements and high
administration costs.
Positive and negative project impacts
Some of the main outputs and outcomes of
the 2 projects are summarized in Table 1
above, and discussed below.
Education and health services
A substantial number of health facilities
and non-formal education centers were
established under both projects. In Pae Por
HDP, well-equipped schools provided a
conducive learning environment for 1500
children—about half of the eligible popu-
lation—while the number of health centers
(Figure 2) was doubled, and staff with hill
FIGURE 2  A primary health care center,
Om Koi—one of the positive outcomes of
the Pae Por project. (Photo by author)
Characteristics, outputs, outcomes
Project area
Pae Por Wieng Pha
Project area (km2) 1,300 1,737
Population 23,000 42,000
Ethnicity Karen Lahu, Lisu, etc.
Paddy rice: average area / household (ha) 0.7 0.1
Upland rice: area per household (ha) 1.1 0.9
Other crops: area per household (ha) 1.3 1.0
Percent households with rice deficit 30% 60%
Initial opium production (ha poppy fields) > 160 > 200
Village education centers established 44 37
Teachers recruited 48 51
Health facilities established 11 8
Community health workers recruited 18 8
Opium addicts treated 476 290
Number of addicts at project initiation 580 221
Addicts at project end 1,184 287
TABLE 1  Pae Por and Wieng Pha:
key characteristics of project
areas, outputs and outcomes.
(Sources: Manu 1987; PPHDP
1986; WPHDP 1987, 1989;
UNDCP 1991, 1992)
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tribe backgrounds provided services such
as vaccination and family planning.
Opium addiction and detoxification
Baseline addiction rates stood at 8% in Pae
Por HDP, and 20% in Wieng Pha, both
exceeding the national estimate for hill
peoples (6.8%). The two projects treated
766 addicts altogether, in community-
based programs in villages or in district
health centers. Rates of non-recidivism
were estimated as 15–20%, not dissimilar
to such programs elsewhere. The cursory
nature of rehabilitation and follow-up lim-
ited impact, and in both areas there was
evidence of an increase in the number of
addicts during the project. Thus opium
addiction remained a massive problem.
Agriculture
In Pae Por HDP, the main strategy was one
of agricultural commercialization, mainly
through the introduction of coffee and
other cash crops. This strategy had several
flaws. Most critical, given the predomi-
nance of subsistence objectives and the
lack of infrastructure and markets, was the
heavy dependence on inputs. Second,
implementation lacked coherence and sus-
tainability: while seeds and fertilizer were
free, distribution was haphazard and
inequitable, and no provision was made to
continue supplies after the end of the proj-
ect. The emphasis on coffee proved unfor-
tunate, as prices fell steeply and failed
even to cover production costs. Further,
the proposed marketing arrangements
were never provided. Only 13% of the tar-
get of 560 ha of coffee was established.
These limitations were the result of
several factors. First, since no research or
consultation was involved in the design of
the component, it took no account of local
production systems or their social and cul-
tural underpinnings (Figure 3). Second,
no attention was given to the development
of sustainable alternatives to shifting culti-
vation. Third, the one-month’s training
provided to the 18 Public Welfare Depart-
ment staff was insufficient to make them
effective extension workers.
Extension in Wieng Pha was provided
by 12 agroforestry extension agents, each
covering 4–5 villages. These were tempo-
rary project employees, and all were male,
ethnic Thais, none speaking any hills lan-
guage. A range of seeds and some comple-
mentary inputs and breeding livestock
were distributed, and some temporary
increases in production seem likely to
have occurred. However, farmers claimed
that distribution was arbitrary and inade-
quate. While new paddy land was to be
developed, only 3% of the target of 
9000 rai (1440 ha) was met because of 
limitations of landform and water avail-
ability. Although cropping intensities in
Wieng Pha were rising and yields falling,
little was done to address the need for
alternative systems of land management, as
the facility’s intention to provide research,
training and demonstration was never
established. The “environmental protec-
tion” component in practice consisted of
the RFD’s reforestation of 1600 ha with
Pinus khesia, with villagers participating as
laborers. The RFD’s policing of land use
continued, forcing farmers into practices
that they knew to be unsustainable.
Impact on opium poppy cultivation
There was little change in the area of pop-
py cultivated and both areas continued to
export opium (Figure 4). In Wieng Pha,
an early decline was followed by almost as
marked a resurgence. Pae Por continued
to account for a significant proportion of
the declining national production of
3200–4800 ha.
FIGURE 3  Karen women weaving, Tha Song Yang, Pae
Por. Neither project paid sufficient attention to traditional
economic activities, especially those of women. (Photo
by author)
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Citizenship and land tenure
Thai citizenship and secure land tenure
are central to hill peoples’ security, liveli-
hoods, and sense of belonging to the
broader society. However, residential and
land security depend on multiple and
sometimes inconsistent criteria and poli-
cies. These include the legal status of vil-
lages under the 1914 Local Administra-
tion Act, the RFD’s 1985 classification of
watersheds, the 1964 National Forest
Reserve Act, and the classification of com-
munities under the 1988 Second Master
Plan for Highland Development and Drug
Abuse Control. The inconsistency of these
rules means that most hill communities’
occupation of their land is irregular
according to at least one criterion, and
they live under the constant threat of evic-
tion, a threat which from time to time is
realized.
In Pae Por, Thai citizenship was grant-
ed to over 12,000 persons (53% of the
population). Beneficiaries regarded this
as the project’s main achievement. Howev-
er, none of the land use permits envisaged
were allocated, as most of the project area
was in Reserve Forest, meaning that cabi-
net approval would have been required.
Land use rights thus remained insecure in
Pae Por, providing little incentive to invest
in sustainable methods of land manage-
ment.
In Wieng Pha, there was no systematic
attempt to provide citizenship. Nor were
any land use permits issued, as this was
against RFD policy in watershed protection
areas. Fully 39 of the 51 villages in Wieng
Pha project area were classified “informal
villages without potential” under the mas-
ter plan, with the ominous implication
that the government intended to relocate
them. Since none of the villages were
legalized during the project, there was lit-
tle advance in the security of residents.
Comparing the 2 projects and their
impacts
Substantial sustainable impact in the
social sectors in both projects was not
matched by effectiveness in either reduc-
ing opium cultivation and use, or in pro-
moting economically and environmentally
sustainable agriculture.
Differences
There were substantial historical, social,
and environmental differences between
the two areas, Pae Por being more remote
and ethnically homogeneous than Wieng
Pha. The histories, cultures, and interests
of the implementing agencies also differed
markedly. DOLA is the agency at the head
of district administration, responsible for
grouping communities into villages and
registering, overseeing, and taxing them:
its role was characterized by a logic of
incorporation. The domain of the RFD, in
contrast, has historically been unoccupied
land and its concern with containment
and exclusion. DOLA, while willing to
grant secure land titles, was unable to do
so. The RFD, although able, was unwilling.
Both viewed the hills minorities
through a lens of national integrity tinged
by ethnic unease. However, DOLA’s aim
was the political and cultural inclusion of
minority populations, the incorporation of
which would allow it to advance its own
territorial interests: hence the emphasis in
Pae Por on the granting of citizenship, and
other initiatives such as “training to create
consciousness of being Thai,” the marshal-
ing of “key villages” into numbered streets
and houses, and the daily broadcasts of
Thai-language radio from loudspeakers set
on poles. The RFD’s officers directed the
project from the fastness of the watershed
offices high in the forest rather than from
the district headquarters where DOLA and
other agencies were located. For them, the
officially perceived threat to environmen-
tal integrity from the hill tribes’ shifting
cultivation reinforced their legitimacy as
guardians of the forest—which, in the face
of pervasive deforestation, was becoming
tenuous to the point of irony. While legis-
lation and regulations governing land
occupation and use were inconsistent, the
RFD’s authority against these “enemies of
FIGURE 4  Opium cultivation in
Pae Por and Wieng Pha HDPs by
season, in hectares of poppy
fields. (Source: WPHDP 1989
and Office of the Narcotics 
Control Board of Thailand)
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the forest” was ultimately founded on the
threat of the consequences for almost any
community or household, were the letter
of the law to be enforced.
Similarities
Despite these differences, both projects
exemplify a model of development as the
spatial extension of state agency staff and
infrastructure. The premise that benefici-
ary populations had little to contribute
was reflected in the lack of meaningful
consultation, despite the project require-
ment that “the active involvement of the
villagers be solicited in the selection, plan-
ning and implementation of project activi-
ties,” according to the Wieng Pha HDP.
The centralization of decision-making
and the disregard of local cultures and
production systems were partly a reflec-
tion of the dominance of the vertical,
clientelistic culture of both implementing
agencies. This explains the lack of flexibil-
ity, neglect of the social context, and the
high overhead costs that characterized
both projects. The priority of outputs over
outcomes based on locally defined needs,
and the vertical reporting system transmit-
ting information upwards only in terms of
predefined indicators—whether or not
these were relevant or even accurate—left
little incentive or scope for responding to
problems identified in the field. Even
when shortcomings became apparent, no
adjustment to the programs followed.
In the case of the health and educa-
tion programs, this top-down ethos was
not disabling. Nonformal education cur-
ricula and health services had been devel-
oped for the hills in other areas, and these
were delivered by well-managed and rela-
tively responsive sectoral institutions.
For agriculture and land manage-
ment, locally specific ecological and social
factors were much more critical, and here
the inflexible culture of implementation
combined with inappropriate design
assumptions proved fatally asphyxiating.
In Pae Por, it was wrongly assumed that
profitable replacement crops were
extendible, while the importance of land
management and tenure security was over-
looked (Figure 5). In Wieng Pha, environ-
mental problems were recognized in the
abstract, but contradictory policies and
administrative sclerosis rendered the cho-
sen strategy non-viable on several counts.
Land rights could not be issued to sta-
bilize land use; and no sustainable land
management technologies were identified
for extension because poor interagency
collaboration hobbled the research com-
ponent that was to develop them. The RFD
fell back upon more familiar, coercive
means of regulating land use by suppress-
ing shifting cultivation. The gap between
expectations raised and achievements reg-
istered was not lost on the inhabitants, one
of whom remarked pithily: “Where there is
thunder, there should be rain.”
FIGURE 5  The project failed to
develop or extend sustainable
alternatives for the popula-
tion’s traditional shifting culti-
vation system. View of Om Koi
village, Pae Por. (Photo by
author)
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